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the nation. Before the adoption of the constitution, and the introduction of system into our commerce and revenues, the unwieldy strength of our people, was giddily floundering among the crude elements of national power and wealth, without method and without effect. The introduction of order and security, produced what seemed to be a preternatural change. Yet, nothing more was done than to liberate and disencumber the energies of the people. The most perfect laws can but give to every kind of laudable industry, its natural reward—the fruits of its labour. It is by attempting something more, that governments most frequently abuse their power; instead of giving talents and industry place, they streighten and encumber them.

The Ichneumon, being an Essay on Politics. Written in the District of Maine, July, 1814. By Don Quixote. They hate him that rebuketh in the gate, and they abhor him that speaketh uprightly. Amos 5th. 10th.

This pamphlet is a curiosity. The author of this political Ichneumon, which was to destroy the crocodile eggs of Democracy, has detailed his plan with such bold frankness, and inimitable simplicity, as must excite the wonder of political cowardice, and the smile of political experience. A work of this kind has long been a desideratum; we have heard so much from those egregious oracles, the exclusive friends of the people, about monarchial designs, and deep laid plots for introducing royalty, nobility, &c.—that being wholly opposed to any such change, and utterly incredulous about its possibility, we were gratified to find, the scheme in a tangible form at last; we have, it is true, heard one or two old men, tired of the vanities of life, and prevented by the apathy of age from strenuous exertions, naturally wishing for nothing but tranquility, flatter themselves it would be found under a king—and one or two young men, who without energy to obtain distinction among their equals, “holding between their fingers a pouncet box,” would discourse most learnedly on the effects of monarchy, whose operation they had never witnessed; and on the dangers of Republicks, which they had never felt—but, we never heard any middle aged person, who could read and write, wish to subvert our own institu-

tions, or believe that we could endure those of royalty. We then, in the present instance, felt a sort of prying, eager curiosity to get at the secret history of this author, expecting to find some insidious, inveterate aristocrat, with a wardrobe of tarnished Court-dresses, with stars and ribands ready for display, and perhaps daggers, and "Foreign Gold"—we were, however, disappointed, and our feelings were greatly relieved, when we were told that this dangerous writer, was a humble, and rather visionary character, residing in a remote village; and that he distributed his pamphlet on the way to this metropolis in a one-horse sleigh, mounted on sacks of wool from his own flock, the proceeds of which were to furnish the necessaries for his family.

Having communicated this account of the author, to prevent in that manly, pure, independent class of men, the leaders of the self named Republicans, a useless solicitude for the safety of their flock, a gentle flock, whose fleece rewards the vigils of its shepherds; we shall now proceed to develop the views of *Don Quixote*, by extracts from his work. It will be recollected that it was written during the late war, and in a district particularly exposed to its pressure; some of his reasonings therefore, are affected by temporary considerations, but the intrinsic beauty and feasibility of the plan are permanent. We begin with his first chapter.

"CHAPTER 1. It would be a very diverting book, could we meet with one, containing many unlearned men's opinions concerning the best mode of government. I presume we should find greater varieties than even Montesquieu was acquainted with.

"The christian powers of Europe have for several centuries past been divided into Monarchies and Republicks. In Switzerland, which was a Republick, Democracy is said to have prevailed more than in Holland and Venice, which have likewise been called Republicks, but in both these, Aristocracy is said to have prevailed. In France, Spain and Portugal, the governments have been called Monarchical. In England, the government has been called a Limited Monarchy. These, with some other inconsiderable variations, have prevailed all over Christendom.—About forty years ago, in this country, a decided majority of the people, gave the preference to a Republican form of government, and we then shook off, after a seven years war, our colonial dependence on Great Britain. Since which, having few rich

among us, our government has continued to be sufficiently Democratical.

“But a misfortune which has attended our democratical poverty, the emoluments for office have been sought after with such avidity, that the seekers of office have not failed to revile their rivals upon every occasion, with the most unchristian, uncharitable, and ungentlemanly language. The consequence is, that now the two parties, which are called Federal and Republican, have but a very poor opinion of the virtues of each other.

“Whenever the Federalists have the success to prevail in their elections, the Republicans are sure to oppose every political measure which is adopted by their successful rival ; and it is exactly the same thing whenever the Republicans prevail in their elections, the Federalists then hang like a dead weight, or like a hog tied by the nose, they make a horrid noise, and it is with difficulty they can at any rate be got along. It has been said, from this collision of parties, that liberty is preserved.—If this be true, this is one instance of an evil tree bearing good fruit.

“From what I have been able to learn, Republican more than Monarchical governments, have always been attended by these political fermentations, and it is highly probable from the nature of mankind, always will be.

“No man will, I think, deny that it is best to have our best men selected for officers, for when an unprincipled man gets into office, that certainly is an evil tree bearing evil fruit.

“In the present state of things, when the people are about to elect a man into office, they never ask whether he be a good neighbor, good father, good husband, or good son, notwithstanding these are the works by which we may know him. They never think of all this, no, the only question they ask, is he on our side? does he hate the Federalists? or does he hate the Republicans? the case is much the same where the President or Governor has to nominate to office ; he, the President, or Governor, is so dependent for his future election upon his own party, that he is obliged by self interest to confine himself in his appointments to that party only. Hence it comes to pass that the opposite party, knowing they have nothing to expect but to be slaves to their successful rivals, during their continuance in office, leave no stone unturned to get them out of office, and get themselves in. In a time of peace, I confess, that we might get along with

such a state of things, but in a time of war, when our adversary is powerful, when he is at our doors, when he has already overrun a part of our country, when he is attacking us at a great many different points, surely it has become necessary that we should be united."

The work afterwards proceeds in the form of a dialogue between "An old Tory" and a "Republican." His chapters are not tedious, and we shall lay those before our readers, which contain the main features of his project.

"CHAP. VI. How to procure the necessary European alliances in the present state of things, I must confess, has for some time past appeared to me too difficult to attempt, but this singular Old Tory says no such thing, nothing is more easy, that we have it in our power to become immediately one of the greatest and most respectable nations in the world. Ah, said I, come let us hear; how can this be brought about? In the first place, says he, there must be a bill brought before the next Congress to alter our Constitution so far as respects the duration of the Presidency, this point being carried, the next to be obtained is, that the President shall be chosen for life, and the office be hereditary in his family. This will place us at least in as respectable a situation as the Dutch are placed; before they could establish their independency they were obliged to choose the Prince of Orange stadtholder, and make the office hereditary in his family—but it seems in the late revolutions in Europe, even that state of things has been thought too nearly related to Republicanism, they have therefore made the stadtholder of Holland king of the Netherlands, whereby it happens there is not a republic in Europe, independent of kings, except it be Switzerland; and what is to be their situation I have not yet learned.

"CHAP. VII. But are you sure, said I, that a bill will pass the Congress for making the office of the President hereditary. Yes, says he, I am sure; for both the parties have now ran themselves aground—the Republicans, by embarking in the same cause with Bonaparte—the Federalists, by promising to do more than they dare attempt; therefore, they will both be glad at any rate, to be relieved from their present unpleasant situation.

"But will the people at large, approve of this alteration? Yes, more than half the people I talk with, say, make what change you please, I am sure our situation cannot be altered for the worse.

"If I am not mistaken, said I, you have always been in favour of monarchical governments. I have, said he. Will you be good enough to tell me, said I, why you give the preference to a monarchical, rather than to a republican government?

"You must confess, said he, that it is important to have our officers circumspect in their behaviour, and likewise, that it is important to have power enough somewhere, to remove them from office when they become unfaithful to the government, or oppressive to the people. Yes, said I, be sure there ought to be such power; well, says he, does any such power exist in our government? Yes, said I, in either the cases you mention, the officer would not be re-elected; this, replied he, is true in theory, but not in practice—who will tell the people of the officers' faults, asked he; I answered, if the officer be Republican, the Federalists will tell of it. What good will that do? said he; whatever the Federalists tell about a Republican officer, the Republicans will not believe it, but they will say, it is a Federal lie.

"If a Federal or Republican officer were to eat a young child every morning for his breakfast, it would be impossible to inform the people of it; for if he was a Federalist, his party would not tell of it. It would reflect upon their judgment in getting him appointed; and it would be exactly the same thing, were he a Republican. It is impossible to make the parties have a worse opinion of one another than they now have. A Federalist had rather submit to the British than have the government any longer in the hands of the Republicans; it is the same with the Republicans, they had rather choose that the government of the country should be given to the Dey of Algiers, than to have it given to the Federalists.—Now, this being the case, what comfort can there be in living under a Republican government?"

"CHAP. VIII. But are you sure, said I, things will be any better in a monarchical government? Yes, said he, in a limited monarchy. Where trial by jury secured, and all laws originate in the House of Representatives, it will

always be the interest of the Prince to conciliate the affections of the people ; in this way only will he be able to obtain money ; the moment he becomes unpopular, he will be in danger of experiencing the fate of Charles the First, and many other equally unfortunate monarchs ; besides, his office being hereditary, this will render him independent of parties ; he will not be obliged to choose his officers out of one particular party ; he will have the whole people to choose out of ; and as office is what we are all seeking after, and either party may equally have hopes of obtaining the prize, there is no danger, that about one half the people will be hanging like a dead weight upon the government, for the Prince will always have it in his power to buy off the popular leaders of both the parties, by nominating them to office."

"CHAP. IX. But, said I, would you have a House of Lords too ? Yes, said he, by all means. In what manner would you have them chosen ? said I. He replied, they ought to be chosen in the same manner as our Senate is chosen ; have the same power our Senate now have ; only let the office be hereditary ; without this aristocratical part of the government nothing would be respectable. Such a House of independent nobles is absolutely necessary to form a kind of check to the democrattick turbulence of the House of Representatives. Without a House of Lords, the government would hardly be respectable, and who wants to live under a disrespectable government ? The more respectable the government is, the less danger will there be of civil war ; and, in the present state of the world, the less danger of any war at all."

"CHAP. X. What difference, said I, would you have in the House of Representatives ? None at all, said he, let them be chosen in the same manner, and for the same time. Would you have any difference in our state governments ? Very little, said he, the only difference I would have in them, the governors should be appointed by the king during pleasure ; but his council should be chosen in the same manner as now, and be of the same duration ; and all the officers, whose appointments are now during good behavior, should be held for the same length of time, and be removed in the same way. What alteration would you have in the militia laws ? None at all ; but it should clearly be

specified, said he, that a drafted militia man should never be compelled to go out of his own state, nor in any case whatever, be obliged to serve more than three months in one year.

"But may not circumstances, said I, so happen, that a deviation from this rule may be necessary? It may be, said he, but it must be a case of urgent necessity; in that case, said he, if the people like the government, there will never be wanting volunteers. The government always ought to have the power of employing and directing the movements of such; but they very rarely ought to have the power of dragging peaceable and useful citizens from their homes, and compelling them to endure all the hardships of a common soldier. If the people like their government, they would always be ready to contribute to its support; if they did not like it, they never ought to be compelled to support it. Why do you have hereditary offices in our government then? said I. For this reason only, said he, to make the government more respectable abroad, and that our first magistrate should not be under the necessity of being the tool of a party."

"CHAP. XI. But would you have, said I, the present Senate of the United States to be the House of Lords? No, says he; I would start fair, let a new election take place, and let the members of the present House of Representatives have a chance to succeed in the election. The reason of this is obvious, for without this provision they would not be so willing to give their consent to the proposed alteration in the government."

"CHAP. XII. Well, said I, in what manner would you have the King chosen? In the same manner, said he, that we have heretofore chosen a President. Who would you pitch upon, said I, suppose it was in your power to nominate? Come let us hear who would you recommend? This subject, said he, admits of but one single question, it certainly ought to be that man who could do us the most good. You would then act, said I, as the Roman soldiers sometimes did; you would sell the office to the highest bidder. Not quite so neither, said he, there is this difference; their conduct was mercenary, mine should be patriotic, and I would recommend that man who would in all probability do us the most good—that man who would soonest be able to procure for us a lasting and honourable peace—that man who would

be able to procure for us the greatest enlargement of territory, for you will find I am not one of those who want to live in a little wrangling Republic ; no, I had rather see all the world united under one great and respectable monarchy, than to see it further subdivided."

"CHAP. XIII. You would then, I suppose, be glad, said I, to have this country united to the British empire. Not so neither, said he ; I would rather see Great Britain become a colony to America ; it would be unnatural, said he, that the lesser should govern the greater territory. Have you any hope, said I, that this will ever be the case ! Yes, I have, said he, a hope ; the thing is possible, said he, and therefore ought to be hoped for, and even attempted. You say it is possible, said I ; for God's sake point out the way ; that I can do easily, said he ; but as this is an important part of the business, we will postpone the consideration of it to another chapter."

"CHAP. XIV. Let us choose for our King one of the youngest of the British Princes ; but before we do this, let us stipulate with the British government that they shall relinquish to us all their territories, except the West-India Islands, in North America. If they will not do this without a pecuniary consideration, let us pay it ; the money may be borrowed in this case of their own subjects. Let us then purchase from the Spaniards a relinquishment of Louisiana and the Floridas ; money for this purpose may likewise be borrowed in England ; all these purchases will not cost so much as continuing the war one year. Our extensive and our convenient harbours will be filled with ships and seamen from every part of the world ; the revenues from this extensive commerce, will, in a very short time, be greater than we shall have any occasion for ; in the mean time, let a navy be provided and encouraged by every reasonable encouragement, let an army be kept on our wilderness frontiers, this will for ever secure us from Indian wars ; by this means the Indians may be progressively organized into regular armies, Christian ministers of all denominations may constantly, at the expense of government, be sent among them ; in a very short time their civilization and conversion to Christianity may be expected ; then will come the time when every American may sit under his own vine and own fig-tree, and have none to make him afraid. Then will come the time, when the wilderness may truly be said to blossom like the rose."

It is difficult to make a serious remark on such a scheme as this ; but if there is any part of it, that has more *naïveté* than another, it is the supposition, that the English government would give us their possessions on this continent, and do every thing to aid us to become a great power, if we would only assume a monarchical form of government, and take one of their “sons” to be at the head of it. Extravagant as this may appear, there are scores of worthy citizens whose sagacious intellect early discovered this fact ; and who have regularly voted against certain individuals, because they were fully convinced of their being employed to carry this plot into effect. Fatuity like this, may be cited against our reasonings in favour of republican government ; but, it should be recollected, what has been sometimes forgot, that it is not peculiar to republicks, and that under any form of government the same folly will exist, and exert its influence on publick measures. For sufficient proof of this, we need only mention the “no popery” cry in England, and its extraordinary effects. We take the authour’s last chapter, for the sake of the humour contained in the anecdote at the close of it, which we do not recollect to have seen before.

“CHAP. XXV. But suppose, said I, in all this business of party dissension and civil war, you should be mistaken ; suppose the fact should be, that there is a secret understanding between the leaders of both parties, and that they have agreed, so far we will go and no further ; what danger in that case would arise from the present division into parties ? In that case I grant, said he, there would not be in theory so much danger, but in practice I have my doubts. You know, said he, political horses sometimes throw very skilful riders ; let them who are in the saddle look to it. And now by way of diversion, said the Old Tory, I will tell you a story : In the reign of Henry eighth, the House of Lords being about to patch up an impeachment against Cranmer, ordered the door-keeper not to admit him. Cranmer came to the door, but could get no admittance. The King had private intelligence of what was going on, he appeared likewise at the door and demanded admission ; the door was immediately opened, the King went in stern foremost, bowing and scraping to Cranmer ; walk in my good Lord Archbishop, said the King ; he then took Cranmer by the hand, led him to his seat, and after seating himself he thus addressed himself to their Lordships—fie upon you,

gentlemen, fie ! why will you not treat one another as you ought ? Here is my good Lord Archbishop, as worthy of his seat in this House as any of you, and you compelled him to stand at your door as a porter.—Treat one another like gentlemen, said the King (at the same time getting up and shaking his cane) if you do not, thank God there is one lives yet, who is able to make you.”

“ This story, said I, holds up to view a tyrannical King, the remembrance of which has aroused anew all my Republican and anti-royal prejudices.—True, said he, I told it for that very purpose ; but now, said he, let us compare this state of things to what followed in the weak reign of his daughter Mary.—At Smithfield there was burned to death, many of the best men in England.—If you will have patience, said he, in order to give you my notions on this subject I will tell you another story.”

“ When, after the death of Oliver Cromwell, General Monk was marching his army toward London, various conjectures circulated respecting which party General Monk would join ; for the nation was now split into a number of parties ; at length it was rumoured that Monk’s intentions were to restore the King ; an old friend of Monk, a zealous Republican, heard the story, but would not believe it ; he went to the General and asked him if the report was true ; It is indeed, said the General. Is it possible ? said the old gentleman ; the very idea of a King sounds to me as bad as the devil ; true, said Monk, just so it sounds to me ; but is there nothing worse than the devil ? said Monk. No, said the old gentleman, how can any thing be worse than the devil ? I will tell you what, said Monk—hell broke loose, is worse than the devil a thousand times.”

Before we advance some opinions in favour of Republican government in this country, let us make a few observations on the state of monarchy in Europe. It is not our object to criminate that form of government, which is the only one suited to the state of society, and the habits of Europe ; and which may exist with a greater or less infusion of freedom, in proportion to the morality and intelligence of the subjects of it. Let us select the limited monarchy of England, confessedly the most mild, the most free, and wielding the most powerful means. A slight examination will shew some of the disadvantages of this form government, where it ex-

ists in the greatest perfection. We are not ignorant of its advantages, we are not pretending to decide, whether the latter do not greatly overbalance the former; we do not intend to discuss the question, whether that nation is susceptible of a pure republican form of government, whether it could have existed under that form, during the recent period of European convulsion. But as remote observers are apt to consider only the favourable side of the picture; we wish to point out some of the shades to those who, having seen it at a distance, are struck only with its glaring lights and prominent beauties. It may at least strengthen our cause with a negative argument.

We say nothing of its early periods; they were a tissue of horrors, not owing to the form of government, but to the state of society. Down to the reign of Queen Anne, insurrections, civil wars and persecutions, were frequent occurrences, and even to a later period, the heads of rebel noblemen were occasionally stuck on poles in the metropolis of the kingdom.

We will assume the period of the momentous and brilliant reign of the present sovereign. This embraces a time when civilization, refinement, and knowledge have made the greatest progress; when able lawyers have defined, skilful advocates defended, and great statesmen maintained, the civil and in some instances the political rights, of the subject. In this period of rapid communication, of wide spread intelligence, and of active humanity, let us run over some of the shadows to which we have alluded. In the first place, Ireland, containing more than one quarter of the population, has been almost constantly harassed with civil war, insurrections, burnings, plunderings, assassinations, and horrors of every description, that have seldom left it for a period of any duration free from the burthen of martial law, in other words, military despotism. Many counties of England itself, have been partially submitted to its forms, and every considerable town owes its quiet, in part, to the establishment of barracks and the presence of soldiers; they have not, however, always experienced security, and all the great towns in the kingdom, including the capital itself, have been, during this reign, sometimes in the hands of the most brutal mobs, in some instances, for days together. We do not mean to assert, that it would not have been much worse under any other form of government; or that they would have continued to exist to this day as a republick. Yet we will say, *en*

passant, if the English had been as familiar with republican habits, as the Dutch, and their character had been long adapted to its forms, that they would have been as triumphant a republick as they now are a monarchy. Holland was not conquered because it was a republick, but because it was a small power overwhelmed by large ones.

If then under the best regulated monarchy, the people are not exempt occasionally from calamities like these, is private virtue absolved from publick exertions? Are the security of individual property, the enjoyment of personal rights and privileges, the repose of luxury and refinement, the spontaneous fruits of royalty, requiring neither cultivation nor watchfulness? The real condition of that country is far indeed from this state of torpid enjoyment. It is true that there are crowds of quiet, obscure individuals of various ranks, who never agitate their minds with publick concerns, and whose highest feeling of patriotism, is the mechanical result of local habits. Such men may be found, and will be unmolested in every country; such existed under the wild democracy of Athens, and thousands of the same kind were luxuriating in undisturbed voluptuousness, under the protecting despotism of Napoleon. But to men who wish to obtain eminence in society, who are anxious to insert their names in the history of their country, who strive for present power, or future fame, and are ambitious of any share either in managing or watching any part of administration, severe duties and constant efforts are necessary.

There is even less difference in this respect between this country and England, than many persons imagine. The possession of political influence there, requires as much, perhaps more exertion, than it does here. The most powerful peers are obliged to engage in all the anxieties, all the intrigues, and infinitely more expense, than is ever called for here, to maintain their local interest. Even the very elections, although they are injuriously and almost oppressively multiplied here, do not so widely differ in the aggregate of inconvenience, as many suppose. Our national representatives are elected every two years. Parliaments in England are nominally for seven, but in fact the average does not exceed four or five. Our elections are completed in one day; theirs last fourteen, if either of the candidates choose it. The scenes of riot, the venality, and the profligacy of all kinds, which accompany these scenes, which

may be called the Saturnalia of England, would indeed be intolerable if they occurred oftener. But a fortnight at a time, which is the case with many of the most important elections, and the labour of canvassing, that occupies many previous weeks, will go far to balance the frequency of our appeals to the community. Besides the choice of members of Parliament, there are municipalities, directors of various important trusts, and great publick associations, the direction of which, excite the most ardent competition and struggling. We mention these facts, merely to shew, what is sometimes forgotten, that the contests of interest and ambition, exist in monarchies as well as in republicks, and that the English constitution does not prevent the necessity of continual exertion. Indeed the quiet which some men sigh after, is only to be found under absolute despotism. The same impatience at being roused to exertion for publick purposes, that is felt by men, who are only solicitous for good government in the hands of others, and for tranquillity in their own persons, is shewn in England, and much more extensively than here. There are individuals who laugh at all political freedom ; and there was not long since, a book published by Mr. Leckie, a better Greek scholar than a politician, which held up the system of elections, as a very irksome farce ; that it would be much wiser, while the question was in agitation, of giving a constitution like the English to the Island of Scily, to adopt the principles of the Sicilian constitution for the Island of Britain.

The English monarchy, then, does not supersede the necessity of political exertion, which is the strongest proof of the free principles incorporated in it. The next consideration is, the sum of happiness enjoyed under it. To estimate this, we must not look at the privileged classes only, but take into view every class of the nation. The higher classes in England are surpassed in dignity by none ; the lower classes are equalled by few ; the middle classes are not only more numerous, but in a higher and more fortunate relative standing, than in any other country in Europe. What is there to place against this large amount of prosperity ? We put Ireland out of the question. That unfortunate country, seems condemned to constant misery and turbulence, through the operation of two causes. Her rents, exacted with grinding severity, are spent by non-resident landlords in other countries ; and her degraded population,

nourished in ignorance by the exuberant bigotry of one religion, is condemned to furnish a luxurious support to the sinecure incumbents of another.

To confine the examination to England herself, we shall only mention the condition of two classes, the sailors, and the manufacturers and mechanicks. The first, may be estimated to contain one fifteenth of the adult male population. It will be difficult to find in any country, a population more utterly destitute of all personal rights than this class; the forced service of the navy, does not, to be sure, like the infernal code of the late French conscription, involve the parents of the individuals; yet so far as it regards the individuals themselves, it is more cruel, more odious, and more hopeless, than the conscription. It is more cruel, because it is exercised with more suddenness, more caprice, and more violence, and without even the appearance of any forms. It is more odious, because it is directed against only one class, and its execution is often influenced by individual tyranny and brutality. It is more hopeless, because there is no chance of promotion; because no length of service, is a guarantee against it, and there is no relief, but disability or death; and because there is no interval of time and space, that can dissolve the liability of allegiance. We are now speaking of a practice, which no man justifies; and which must fairly be supposed to be inevitable, since in England, a country which abounds with intrepid, enlightened philanthropists, no one now ventures to mention this monstrous system. The case of the manufacturers and mechanicks is not quite so bad; still they enjoy only a portion of the rights of their fellow subjects. The farmer and labourer may expatriate themselves in pursuit of that subsistence, which they cannot find at home. But the mechanick or manufacturer, who when employment fails, endeavours to escape from starvation, is liable to be arrested and treated as a felon. In fact, they are chained to their country, and one of the most oppressive principles of the feudal law, still bears upon them, long after the rest of the nation has been freed from its burthens.—This is a very invidious subject, we do not wish to pursue it, our object is only defensive, to shew to those who have been dazzled with the advantages of the British constitution, that it is not entirely without defects; and that a considerable portion are de-

prived of the dearest rights, to maintain the security and prosperity of the rest.

The constant exertion of the right of suffrage, and jealous investigation of all public measures required by a republican government, have always been urged as strong objections against its stability. The first gives such perpetual opportunities to demagogues, to mislead and corrupt the lower classes of citizens, while the higher are soon fatigued with the repeated and often ungrateful duties of both. For a very long period, however, there is less to fear from the corruption of the lower, than from the apathy of the higher classes.* As a security against this fatal effect, it is obvious, that these political duties are in reality a very slight burthen, except on a few who volunteer as sentinels. Habit contributes to render these duties more easy ; and the example of all governments proves, that our choice is between a stagnating abasement, under the calm of despotism, or ennobling exertion on the tempestuous sea of liberty. Surely the equal participation of personal rights, and enjoyment of personal protection, constitutes a treasure that is worth contending to perpetuate. To every man of generous feelings, there is an elevated pride in knowing, that he forms part of a people, standing higher than any other in political rank ; there is something exhilarating in the consciousness, that the advantages he may enjoy, are not purchased by any sacrifice of the rights of others.

In estimating the dangers of republican governments, we have always thought, that sufficient allowance has not been made for the power of habit, which is of vastly more importance, than any enactments or written constitutions. Had our war of Independence formed a revolution properly so called, had we been previously accustomed to the restraints of even limited monarchy, and the people been divided into distinct classes, invested with peculiar privileges ; and then, in throwing off allegiance to a foreign nation, had they assumed, for the first time, the exercise of the democratick principle, such a revolution, notwithstanding our greater sobriety, might have terminated as wretchedly, as that of France. But no such revolution took place ; the same cus-

* We use the word *higher* and *lower* classes in reference to education, profession and property ; *classes* is a term of convenience, though in the strict sense of the word, it can hardly be applied in this country.

toms, the same principles, the same feelings governed the people ; and the change was in fact little at variance with these ; and of vastly less importance, than the passage of power from a Catholick to a Protestant family, was to the feelings and habits of the people of England. It is novelty which is dangerous in government ; often more hurtful than established abuses. The force of habit was fatally shewn in France, nay even in England, where the democratick principle forms a considerable constituent feature in the government and the character of the people ; yet they were incapable of supporting a republick, and were eager to return to their former customs. It is difficult to find an individual who can pass from a monarchy to a republick, or vice versa, and have his new duties sit easy and graceful upon him. It is utterly impossible for a nation to undergo the first of these changes ; and for a republick to subside permanently into a monarchy, can only happen by the slowest operation of circumstances, foreign subjugation excepted ; and never till its character and institutions have so far deteriorated, that the revolution will be rather a process of decay, than an establishment of increasing strength.

Next to this influence of habit, may be ranked the state of property, and the character of our population. The former is almost equally divided ; the nature of our laws must keep it so ; and the latter, hardly contains any portion of mere populace. Every man is, or may be a holder of real estate ; he may possess a portion of the territory in fee simple, a privilege which is even denied to great wealth in some countries in Europe, and can only be enjoyed by that, in any. The majority of the voters, then, are landholders, such men may be deluded for a time, but instinct, if not reason, will bring them right at last.

Another principle, which forms the glory of political science, and the greatest improvement of the moderns over the ancients, the principle of representation, is here carried into all the ramifications of government. Every thing is delegated ; and wherever the principle of delegation obtains, provided the practice is familiar to those who exercise it, the particular modification is of secondary importance. The American people never act like the populace of Rome and Athens, immediately from themselves, except they are in a state of insurrection ; they delegate others for every operation. Their delegates may not always be wise ones ;

they may mistake hollow pretensions for sound principles, and plausible professions for honest intentions ; nations, like individual men and women, must pay for the pleasure of being flattered and deceived, either with their pockets or their persons, and be fortunate if they escape both. But a frequent resumption of power, will sooner or later enable them to retrieve their mistake.

We think the history of the country, has hitherto proved this to be the case in many instances. Even where this is delayed, the very circumstance of being in power, the irresistible operation of government is, to make those who administer it, support its principles, and strengthen its foundations. This very operation is now before our eyes. When the government first went into action, all the measures of administration were to be arranged ; these, with few exceptions, discovered so much wisdom, as well as, moderation, as proved their authors to have possessed an equal share of sagacity and virtue. When a series of political intrigues carried the government into other hands, we then experienced a most important crisis. Innovation was borne on the shoulders of popular delusion into every department, and it is possible at this early period, if the prime mover had been younger, and able to have kept the reins a few years longer, and no foreign pressure had intervened to force us together ; then, indeed, we might have fallen back into our original condition ; all the hoops that bound us would have been loosened, and we should have fallen like a *shook* cask, into the anarchy from which we had been raised, a collection of poor, divided, unprotected States. But his successors partly from sounder views, partly from external circumstances, have abandoned the fatal absurdities which brought them into power, and resumed the solid, original principles of the government. The nation seems disposed, in many respects, to go with them, and a very few years must so fix all the establishments, that the administration will become, with slight exceptions, an affair of routine. The contest will then be for place, rather than principle, and whenever this is the case, the result is really of less consequence, than in the warmth of party feeling we are sometimes apt to imagine.

Among the numerous trite and false maxims which have been currently received, and confidently retailed on the subject of popular forms of government, the one which

makes the extent of the country, an argument against the existence of such forms, is the most conspicuous. Nothing can be more directly opposed to truth. The almost infinite complication of machinery in the government of a free country, which constitutes the perfection of modern political science, the wide extent over which this system is extended; are the surest guarantees of its solidity. The Union composed of separate States, unembarrassed by local details of police and administration, has its attention only occupied by the movements of Foreign relations, and some few of the more important bearings of internal economy. The States, again subdivided into counties, into towns, into parishes, the scale of power and independence gradually diminishing, till a minute and perfect organization is the result; furnishes by all this gradation of corporate capacities, a most admirable mode of obtaining a true knowledge of public sentiment; the same system presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to its subversion, by the difficulty of corrupting so many different bodies, or combining them to act in concert against it. There may be a partial derangement, and yet the motion of the whole not be seriously impeded. The scheme may be compared to certain collections of machinery; popular will, is the great moving power which keeps the whole in motion; and if a portion gets heated or deranged, it may be detached from the rest for temporary repairs, without arresting the movement of the whole. On this subject let us make two quotations, from one of the wisest political treatises now possessed by the world. 'To this catalogue of circumstances, that tend to the melioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to adduce one more on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new constitution; I mean the *enlargement of the orbit*, within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single state, or to the consolidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy.' *Federalist*, vol. 2, p. 55.

'It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it be within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere

may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.' Idem. vol. 3, p. 35.

There was one source of danger to our republican institutions, which every day must diminish. The glare, "the pomp and circumstance" of royalty, might easily dazzle the citizens of a youthful republic, hardly known in the world, and only distinguished for their happy state of peace and laborious enterprise. When they had shewn themselves capable of other energies, greater confidence in themselves, and greater respect from others, naturally followed. The manly, dignified pride of republican freedom, must inevitably obtain at last the highest station in the opinion of the world; as the gaudy luxury of Persia was abashed at Roman simplicity, so every day, which adds to our growth and our fame, will diminish the comparative glitter of royalty, and attach the highest respect to the highest state of freedom. Examine two rival portraits.—Observe the exalted sense of honour, which makes the Peer of a monarchy devote his life for his sovereign, regarding that sovereign as the personification of the majesty of his country, profoundly submissive to him, courteous to his equals, gentle to his inferiours, "feeling dishonour like a wound," and proud of his decorations, as they are the reward of his services and the gift of his king.—Consider the patriot of a republic, who feels all outward trappings of distinction to be only irksome foppery, who serves his country for no other reward but the fame of serving her; who *primus inter pares*, can reflect with generous complacency, that he has no superiours, nor inferiours, except to his personal merit and services: who engages in publick life with affability, but without subserviency, who looks without disdain, for truer appreciation, than that of temporary popularity; who can smile in retirement at the backwardness of his fellow-citizens who may prefer a sorry demagogue to himself, ready when danger approaches, to resume the place which only courage and talent can fill.* If such characters are rare, we believe at least the latter are as numerous as the former, and the superiority between them cannot be doubtful.

* A celebrated writer has said, *Des qu'il y a du danger, tout se range, le courage prends sa place.*

It would take a volume to discuss all the points of this subject: and after all our wishes and belief, there is something excessively discouraging on the opposite side. For in theory, the gradual degradation and ultimate subversion of a democrattick republick from intrinsick causes, seems so nearly inevitable, that it may almost be reduced to the form of a diagram, and demonstrated with all the neatness of mathematical certainty. We are overwhelmed too by the reputation of those able men, whose pure hearts and ardent minds, impressed and alarmed with this conviction, have laboured to avert the catastrophe, by arguments, by warning, by prophecy: true Laocoons these! whose only reward, was to have their popularity strangled by the foul serpents of deception and calumny.

The friends of order, of quiet, of stability and national honour, may be often "nailed to the north wall of opposition;" but as this class must possess the largest portion of talents and wealth, the bulk of their fellow citizens who possess any share of intelligence or property, and a large majority are now in this situation, will never be very far from them; and abuses cannot long remain enormous without correction.

To young men of generous minds, who feel that admiration for liberty and republican institutions, which a perusal of the immortal works of antiquity, can hardly fail of creating, we would recommend the study of the *Federalist*; they will there find the principles of freedom, and the constitution of their country, delineated and defended with the utmost ability and perspicuity. Legitimate opposition forms the grand preservative of a free government; but its continuity is often wearisome and irksome, and yet it must be continued, or the power of rallying on emergency, abandoned. In the political drama, the striking scenes and grandest movements earnestly engage attention; while the mere *recitative* of opposition is lifeless and fatiguing; the work we have mentioned may be safely recurred to, as a salutary cordial to raise the spirits and confirm attention. To conclude, we may be vexed with abuses, we may be mortified at seeing low minds in places of eminence, we may be amused at having some *Mr. Tugalls* to tell us, who shall be our Chief Magistrate—Yet so long as we shall have able and pure men, who by their writings and speeches, will enlighten, guide, and animate publick opinion—we shall "never despair of the republick."